T wo kinds of generality can be attributed to logical types in Principia Mathematica, and they ought to be clearly distinguished. The Wrst one, which I will call "external generality", pertains to the formality of types as introduced in the Introduction (to the Wrst edition) of Principia. I claim indeed that the formal system of ramiWed type theory lends itself to diTerent "epistemic realizations", in which each type is assigned a particular interpretation, namely the set of all concrete propositional functions of that type in the epistemic realization that is considered. For example, the concrete propositional function "xz is green" will correspond to a universal if it turns out to be an object of acquaintance in the epistemic perspective at stake, and otherwise to a deWnite description involving higher-order quantiWcation. In the Wrst case only, it will be part of the interpretation of the type of predicative Wrst-order propositional functions. That variety of possible epistemic counterparts of each type is what substantiates and explains its formality.
The second kind of generality that can be attributed to logical types, and which I will call "internal generality", bears on typical ambiguity, as described in Russell and Whitehead's "Prefatory Statement of Symbolic Conventions" at the beginning of Principia, Volume ii. My claim is that it can be formalized within speciWc systems of modern typed lambdacalculus. In particular, a recent paper (Kamareddine et al. 2002) shows that the theory of logical types can be formalized in the way of a lambdacalculus. This opens the way to an interesting reconciliation between type theories in the Russellian sense of the word, and type theories in the modern sense. But typical ambiguity is not taken into account in the paper. I would like to take up that question of typical ambiguity, by extending the typed lambda-calculus to be used.
1.wformal theory and epistemic realizations of logical types
Referring to Quine and Sommerville, Nicholas GriUn makes the following remark:
… Russell's type theory is to some extent context sensitive: for example, an item which, in one context, may be taken to be simple may, in another, turn out to be complex; and thus terms like "individual" or "Wrst-truth" are not stable across contexts…. An example occurs in connection with the word "Socrates" which when used by Socrates himself denotes a simple individual of Socrates' acquaintance; whereas, when used by someone who has never met Socrates, it is a complex hidden description to be analyzed by Russell's theory of descriptions. Thus Socrates is a possible value of z/zxz is an individual/ only for Socrates himself, for others, with no acquaintance with Socrates, Socrates is not a possible value for that function…. In general, since diTerent people are acquainted with diTerent items, the range of total variation for functions like z/zxz is an individual/ will be diTerent for diTerent people. Thus it is intolerable to treat such functions as propositional functions of logic. (GriUn 1980, p. 138) This is in fact, I think, a general and very important point, which is worth developing. Indeed, the ramiWed type theory set out in the Introduction of the Wrst edition of Principia Mathematicaz constitutes a formal system that gives rise to a multiplicity of epistemic analyses, each analysis depending on the stock of individuals and universals with which the sub-ject under consideration is acquainted. Let's consider, for instance, the proposition expressing that a certain individual a is green and that another individual b is a great general. If I am in acquaintance with both the individual az and the universal Green, I shall say, using the formal language of Principiaz :
(1) Ga (elementary truth, Wrst-order proposition)
On the other hand, having only access to az as to "the Fy", I shall say:
Having only access to green as in "the colour of grass" ("CoG"), I shall say:
(
Eventually, by combining the two descriptions, I shall say: In the third case, "green" is nothing but an incomplete symbol. Nevertheless, its occurrence in any context will generate a second-order quan-tiWcation. In view of this fact, green may be identiWed with a secondorder propositional function with one individual argument. Therefore, in that case, supposing furthermore that Being a great generalz is a universal to me, my epistemic diagram will be the following:
C Individuals: a, Being a great general C Predicative propositional functions of individuals: x is a great general C Second-order propositional functions of individuals: "x is green", i.e.,
x has the colour of grass,
whereas in the Wrst case, supposing furthermore that I understand the property of being a great general only as the property of having all predicates common to great generals in history, it will be:
C Individuals: a, Green C Predicative propositional functions of individuals: x is green C Second-order propositional functions of individuals: "x is a great general", i.e., x has all the predicates that make a great general.
And so forth for the other cases. The quotation marks are meant to express the fact that the Wrst epistemic subject does not speak for herself, but only uses a predicate that she borrows from another subject's language. The contextual deWnition of "green" in one case, or of "being a great general" in the other, works as an interpretation rule from an epistemic universe to another.
1.1wTypes as translation patterns
Principiaz 's ramiWed type theory allows us to distinguish among the statements from (1) to (4), even between (3) and (4)-hence the utility of Wne-grained types. Indeed, these statements express propositions involving propositional functions of diTerent types, even if these propositions correspond, in some way, to the "same" state of aTairs. The logical structure of the situation will thus vary from subject to subject, and so will more generally the realization of the whole theory of logical types.
Principia mentions only variables of propositional functions, because otherwise a particular way of analyzing reality would be wrongly privileged. On the contrary, the theory of logical types remains a neutral scaTolding that every epistemic subject implements in a speciWc way. In other words, the epistemic counterpart of ramiWed type theory is an open multiplicity of realizations, each of which selects which terms will inhabit such and such type.
All terms turn out to be predicative, because they all get interpreted by predicates-which ones depends on the epistemic universe that happens to be considered. To get back to Russell's example, "Napoleon was a great general", as uttered by some subject Sz 1 , is understood by some other subject Sz 2 as: "(cz ) : f z!z(cz z!zẑz ) . ' . cz z!z(Napoleon)". (We suppose that "being a predicate required in a great general" is a predicative second-order propositional function f z!z(czz!zẑz ) common to both Sz 1 and Sz 2 .) Types of ramiWed type theory keep track of properties that some 1 See Chihara 1973, p. 43, for an example. subject cannot identify with any predicate that would be available to her. Here the translation rule
adds no non-predicative terms to Sz 2 's universe: "Gẑ xy" is only emulated from Sz 2 's point of view, that is, introduced in Sz 2 's language as a mere symbol in order to account for some of Sz 1 's sentences. Still, Sz 2 needs to be able to quantify over such symbols, which means using variables ranging in fact (in Sz 2 's perspective) over a domain of non-predicative terms, but only in a substitutional way. In other words, non-predicative functional terms are only the nominal equivalent, within one epistemic perspective, of what is accessible, within another epistemic perspective, as a predicative function. Accordingly, non-predicative variables are introduced, but only in view of a substitutional reading of quantiWcation, as a way to render predicative quantiWcation in some other epistemic universe. Here the complex type of Sz 2 's counterpart of Gz z!zx underlies the translation of terms such as "Gxz " by providing it with a pattern common to all the instances of the same structure (see the rules for type assignment below).
Viewed as translation patterns between epistemic universes, types correspond to all possible particular functional forms that one can specify without overstepping the sphere of the schematic. Types are assigned to variables so it is usually thought that they basically consist in ranges. 1 But types are primarily types of propositional functions, and types of variables only in a derivative way. Types are not domains, but forms, whose Wne-grainedness ought to be maximal.
This means at least that, in the realm of ramiWed type theory, the type of any propositional function fẑ x can be conceived of as a diagram displaying not only the simple types of the apparent variables occurring in f, but the number of such apparent variables, as well as their respective types; and not only that, but also the number and the respective types of all the real variables, so that the diagram of anything involved in the arguments, as well as (possibly) in the arguments of these arguments (if the arguments at issue are themselves functions), in the arguments of the arguments of the arguments, and so forth, in an inductive manner. So the general form of a functional type ought to be: +ty a 1 z , …, ty a m z ; ty r 1 z , …, ty r n z ,, where the ty a j y's are the respective types of apparent variables, and the ty r i y's are the respective types of real variables, ordered according to their occurrences. The type of individuals then becomes +! ; !, = o. The type of (xz ) . cz z (x, ŷy) is +o ; oz ,, the type of (cz ) . f z!z(fz!zẑz , cz z!zẑz , xz ) is ++! ; oz ,; +! ; oz ,, oz ,, that is, +(oz ); (oz ), oz ,, where (oz) = +!, oz ,. The order is not mentioned, because it can always be determined directly from the type: the order of an individual is 0, and the order *fz * of a function fz of type +ty a 1 z , …, ty a m z ; ty r 1 z , …, ty r n z , is: max (*ty a i y*, *ty r j y*)1z #izz#m 1z #jzz#n w + 1. Predicative propositional functions can then be deWned as usual, as the functions whose order is the least possible with respect to their type. By extension, I shall call a type predicative when it is the type of predicative functions, and a variable predicative when all its instances have a predicative type.
1.2wA Russellian concept of model
The reference in Principiaz to an epistemic perspective on logical types, and the need to sharply distinguish between the formal setting of ram-iWed type theory, on the one hand, and such-and-such particular epistemic realization of it, on the other hand, is shown in particular by the following well-known passage:
... "fzz!zxz" is a function which contains no apparent variables, but contains the two real variables fz z!zẑz and x. (It should be observed that when f is assigned, we may obtain a function whose values do involve individuals as apparent variables, for example if fz z!zxz is (zyz) . cz z(x, yz). But so long as f is variable, fz z!zx contains no apparent variables.) (PMz 1: 52) At Wrst sight, it seems diUcult to make sense of the ambiguity of fz z!zx that Russell suggests. Russell does not mean that, as long as fz z!zx is not analyzed, it cannot contain apparent variables: that would amount to saying that fz z!zxz 's internal structure does not exist as long as we do not want to see it. Russell could mean that fz z!zxz is only a schematic matrix for genuine propositional functions such as (z yz ) . cz z (x, yz ). But then the internal structure of fz z!zxz should mirror that of its possible instances, and so fz z!zxz could be non-predicative, which Russell seems to exclude. In fact, I think that fz z!zxz and (z yz ) . cz z (x, yz ) belong to two totally diTerent environments, and that the ambiguity that Russell brings out relies upon the gap between those two environments. Indeed, as a formal term of the theory of logical types, "fz z!zxz " is but a Wrst-order predicative variable. Its assigned value in a given epistemic universe will be a speciWc predicate, but the counterpart of that predicate in another epistemic universe may be a propositional function whose scheme is (z yz ) . cz z (x, yz )z -z where "cz z (x, yz )" is not another variable, but a schematic letter standing for some actual binary relation. The two cognitive subjects whose epistemic universes are considered here will use the same term, but analyze it in two diTerent ways.
The "realizations" of the theory of types are all possible epistemic diagrams as above, together with translation rules between them. Unlike the model-theoretic perspective, the Russellian notion of interpretation takes elementary equivalence (or the corresponding feature) for granted: as a matter of principle, two "corresponding" private statements have the same truth value (let us not clarify the "correspondence" which is at stake here). There is no real comparison between the diTerent Tarskian interpretations of a logical language and the diTerent realizations of ramiWed type theory, because, in the latter case, the resources of the language (among which are the available proper names) are precisely the changing parameters. Thus, on the one hand, Russell considers that the variable fz is "assigned" concrete propositional functions, which is quite analogous to the way in which values are assigned to variables in Tarskian semantics. But, on the other hand, two diTerent realizations diTer in their logical analysis of reality, and never in the truth values they give to sentences, which is at complete odds with Tarskian semantics. Two diTerent models of ramiWed type theory are like two sections of the same universe, and types correspond, in each section, to reference marks for the logical representation of that section: predicative types correspond to the frontal sides, and non-predicative types to the dotted lines that occur in a drawing in perspective.
If a subject Sz 1 knows az only as "the Gy", she will assert something like "Fy(the Gy)", i.e.:
without being able to indicate any possible instance for x. Any other subject Sz 2 in acquaintance with az , on the contrary, would be able to instantiate xz . No subject is acquainted with all the possible instances of x, that is, with everything. The admission of a, as a quasi-value for an entity variable, into Sz 1 's epistemic domain, hinges on Sz 1 's believing that 2 PM  14.18, 1: 180. See  20.71 about classes. The formal properties that Russell alludes to here are all the laws of the "theory of apparent variables", such as  9.2 (the rule of universal instantiation). Sz 2 's identiWcation of (what Sz 1 conceives of as) the G with some actual entity a is reliable. Granted that the G actually exists, "the Gy" becomes what Russell calls a construction, with the same status as other logical constructions. This means in particular that this deWnite description then "has (speaking formally) all the logical properties of symbols which directly represent objects" 2 : it can, by extension, instantiate any individual variable.
Individual variables do not refer to actual objects of acquaintance only, but also, for each subject Sz , to the virtual objects of acquaintance that Sz receives from any other subject whom she deems to be trustworthy. This is how Sz 1 gets the missing quasi-value of xz in (5)z -z to the extent that she trusts Sz 2 . The all-inclusive range of "xz " becomes in that way the asymptotic result of the information Xow shared by all truthful epistemic subjects, or the symmetric equilibrium hopefully reached by all epistemic players. It does not consist in a single domain of objects of acquaintance, but is comprised, from the point of view of each subject, of proper values andz of quasi-values conveyed by others.
1.3wEpistemic model theory
Epistemic realizations are a natural thing to bring up as soon as Principiaz 's ramiWed type theory is understood as a formal scheme to be applied in a natural-language environment. The reducibility axiom lends itself to an epistemological interpretation:
Although our access to a function fz is mediated by quantiWcation over other functions, this in no way precludes the existence, within the hierarchy, of extensionally equivalent predicative functions or functions of order 1.… The axioms of acquaintance and reducibility postulate (respectively) the possibility of knowing individuals and classes in terms of functions that possess a certain epistemic transparency, a transparency embodied by acquaintance in the one case and the absence of complex forms of quantiWcation in the other. Classes occur in the hierarchy only under the guise of predicative functions, which are the means by which they are known. Reducibility thus postulates a concordance between mathematical reality and our knowledge of it that the ramiWed theory is otherwise unable to demonstrate. (Demopoulos and Clark 2005, p. 158) Once the epistemological background of Principiaz 's types is given some attention, the reducibility schemata can be understood as meaning that, for any propositional function, there is always an epistemic realization in which that function, as a symbol, is interpreted by a genuine term. In the case of individuals, any object introduced by a deWnite description and assumed to exist (as opposed to "the actual king of France"), must correspond, up to a shift in epistemic context, to an actual individual. This is a kind of quasi-acquaintance principle.
In the case of propositional functions, the axiom schema says that any non-empty functional term corresponds, in some epistemic universe, to an actual predicate, going in fact with a whole list of conditions. Let's consider, for example, a translation pattern such as
This equivalence holds even though, among all the predicates fz at stake in (') that Sz 1 has access to, there are some for which Sz 2 does not have any predicative counterpart. Suppose now that fyz z!z(yf, ẑz ) itself belongs to Sz 2 's epistemic universe. Then, for any particular Gz also belonging to that universe, Fx . ' x . fyz (Gz!zẑz , xz ) has to be valid in Sz 2 's realization. The validity of Fx . ' x . fyz (Gz!zẑz , xz ) is part of the list of conditions that goes along with (').
Once again, I think that epistemic realizations are the semantic counterpart of the theory of logical types, and that distinguishing the latter from the former is the only way to understand the status of non-predicative terms-and in particular to understand their syntactic possibility despite the fact that one never Wnds variables of non-predicative propositional functions in Principia. It should be added that epistemic subjects mean nothing else here but complete epistemic diagrams, that is, ways in which reality could be carved up. Hence, they are not metaphysically loaded, and besides remain quite remote from actual concrete cognitive subjects. So, in fact, a formal semantics based on epistemic diagrams has only subsequent connections with epistemology properly speaking. 3 The array of all possible interpretations of a single type, according to 4 See Feferman 2004. According to Feferman, "the use of typical ambiguity is a way of saving face" (p. 138) despite the fact that, as Russell himself acknowledges, "there are as many 0's as there are types." Feferman proposes a system of set theory with countablymany nested "reXective universes" U n , each of which is an elementary substructure of the universe. The resulting system ZFz / U <v z , which is proved to be a conservative extension of ZFz, is intended primarily to provide a foundational framework for category theory, and in particular to account for cases of self-membership such as the category of all categories. Feferman considers that type theory, on the contrary, "doesn't lend itself to the Xexible expression of mathematical properties" (p. 140). In what follows, I wish to vindicate both type theory, in the form of modern systems of lambda-calculus, and category theory, by showing that the former is rich enough to formalize Russellian typical ambiguity, and that the latter is the only possible semantical framework for those systems. diTerent epistemic perspectives, is the true content of its formality. Since it is based on actual applications of ramiWed type theory to the analysis of ordinary language and knowledge conditions, the generality thus brought up can be said to be external. On the contrary, the ambiguityz z of logical types, as justiWed in Russell and Whitehead's "Prefatory Statement", is a totally diTerent kind of generality bestowed on types in Principia. Since it consists in the ability to use types as representatives of indeWnitely many others, within the same hierarchy of purely logical types, typical ambiguity can be described as an internal generality, rather than as an external one. It is often conceived of as a useful device that allows the system of Principia to have a type of all types without laying itself open to the logical inconsistency of having such a universal type. Though powerful and innocuous it may be, it is commonly considered as an informal convention that is not really amenable to any intra-systematic treatment, and, to that extent, it involves a kind of shortcoming of the system.
On the contrary, I would like to defend the view that typical ambiguity is an intrinsic part of the notion of logical type, and not a feature merely tacked on to the conception of types as developed in the Introduction. Typical ambiguity has been deemed to be an ad hocz solution to discharge a generality that was at the same time precluded for impredicativity reasons. Russell was trying to "have his cake and eat it too". 4 Such a diagnosis can be corrected: typical ambiguity can indeed be understood as a feature that is on a par with the rest of the system. All that is needed is to provide for its formal regimentation. Such a formalization has been explored, in particular by Harper and Pollack (1991) , but it does not consider Principiaz as anything other than a historical landmark, and 5 Bertrand Russell Archives, manuscript 230.030890, fos. 32-3. involves the diUcult tools of the calculus of constructions. In the following, I hope to show that a more simple extension of typed lambdacalculus can be suUcient to formalize typical ambiguity in a neat way.
2.wtypical ambiguity and polymorphism of types
Typical ambiguity is actually a theme that shows up quite early in Russell's logical works. This is borne out by a manuscript dating back to 1907, and entitled "Types":
We must write f z!za for a function whose arguments are of any type other than individuals: then a e b ' y(zf z!zbz) . = . f z!za Df and so on. In this way, the theory of all types can be done at once.
There is some obscurity about the Primitive idea f z!za. May this contain apparent variables of any type, however high? …
… We can construct f z!zfzxz with any f we like, and then substitute a more complicated f. The fact that f may contain an fz as apparent variable does not matter at all. The way to explain things is as follows:
(1).wfx stands for anything containing x, and being a proposition for every value of x.
(2).wf z!zfzxz stands for anything containing values of f, and containing these values with arguments which are constants or apparent variables, and containing these values only in propositional positions.
(3).wF z!zf z!zyfyxz stands for anything containing values of fz in a similar way. The point is that fz and Fz stand for ways of construction, and do not presuppose any knowledge of what is to be put in as argument beyond what can be got from lower types alone. 5
The "ways of construction" to which Russell refers in 1907 are construed a few years later, in Russell and Whitehead's "Prefatory Statement", as "symbolic forms". A symbolic form is nothing other than what diTerent types have in common, to the extent that they arise from the same functional skeleton, for diTerent typical determinations of the variables. Thus typical ambiguity conWrms that types are not levels or domains, but themselves propositional schemes: 6 See Scedrov 1990. 7 Crole 1993, p. 202 .
When a proposition containing typically ambiguous symbols can be proved to be true in the lowest signiWcant type, and we can "see" that symbolically the same proof holds in any other assigned type, we say that the proposition has "permanent truth." … It is convenient to call the symbolic form of a propositional function simply a "symbolic formz". Thus, if a symbolic form contains symbols of ambiguous type it represents diTerent propositional functions according as the types of its ambiguous symbols are diTerently adjusted.…
To "assert a symbolic form" is to assert each of the propositional functions arising for the set of possible typical determinations which are somewhere enumerated. We have in fact enumerated a very limited number of types starting from that of individuals, and we "see" that this process can be indeWnitely continued by analogy.
(PMz 2: xii)
Admittedly, Russell and Whitehead's resort to "seeing" betrays a kind of embarrassment. Type variables would be needed to express formally what Russell and Whitehead here allude to. But, for obvious reasons of circularity, it is impossible to quantify over types. That is why typical ambiguity has often been understood as a mere corrective. My aim is to qualify that predicament, drawing on modern type-theoretic frameworks. A recent paper (Kamareddine et al. 2002) shows that the theory of logical types can be formalized by means of a lambda-calculus. But typical ambiguity is left aside. I would like to extend the suggestion by showing that typical ambiguity can be captured, on one condition: shifting to stronger "polymorphic" type-theoretic calculi.
2.1wTypical ambiguity as parametricity
Polymorphism is a feature of programming languages in which "generic data types" are introduced that allow programmers to express the generality of uniformz algorithms. 6 An example of that kind of behaviour is the programme which performs the swapping of the values of two variables ranging over integers: 7 swap (var m, nz : Int) var tz : Int Begin tz : = m Generality of Logical Types 97 m = n nz : = t End It is clear that the programme works exactly the same for variables of any other type. It is, of course, much more eUcient to be able to implement a general swapping programme, regardless of the type of the variables. This is made possible by the introduction of type variablesz : general swap (type: Xz z ; var m, nz : Xy) var tz : X Begin tz : = m mz : = n nz : = t End where the type variable Xz z is assigned a value at each call of the procedure. This is exactly the kind of situation that Russell had in mind. Type variables have been introduced in the realm of modern type theories to substantiate the idea that certain procedures have a generic value.
2.2wPolymorphic second-order type theory
Polymorphic second-order type theory (pso) is actually a whole family of formal systems of typed lambda-calculus which provide a formal syntax for writing down functional terms and which include variables of types. The characteristic feature of pso is that it allows explicit abstraction or quantiWcation on type variables, both in types and terms, giving rise to "polymorphic types" and "polymorphic terms". That is why pso is also called "impredicative type theory" (inasmuch as a type can be introduced through a quantiWcation over the collection of all types).
In ordinary lambda-calculus each term codes a proof of the proposition coded by its type: this is the "propositions-as-types" interpretation. Consequently, any polymorphic term takes types as inputs (including its own type), giving terms as outputs, and can be viewed as a generic proof, that is, as a uniform procedure to prove propositions which diTer only 8 I follow here Roy Crole's exposition of pso given in Crole 1993. with respect to the kind of things to which they pertain, and whose respective proofs, consequently, are "structurally" the same. A polymorphic term is nothing but the representation of the pattern common to analogous proofs. This holds for proofs as well as for operations such as the swapping of values.
Let me Wrst set out the main lines of pso. The basic type symbols are type variables X, Y, Z, …. Types are then constructed inductively through construction rules. In particular, if "Fy" is any type symbol of non-zero arity n, and if F 1 , …, F n are nz types, then Fy(F 1 , …, F n z ) is a type (think here of propositional connectives as binary functional types). On top of that, if a type variable Xz occurs in a type Fy(Xz y), second-order abstraction ;Xz gives rise to a universal type ;X . Fy(Xyz ). The syntax is summed up in the following list: 8
The rules to generate well-formed types refer to type contexts, that is, lists D of distinct type variables that are supposed to serve as elementary blocks for the construction of the well-formed (or "proved") types.
Proved types:
C Variables:
D, X, DN|X C Functions:
Using the rules above, derivation trees can be built whose conclusion is a judgment Dz|F, called a proofz of the type F in the context D.
Terms are deWned starting with variables of diTerent types, and then using construction rules: function symbols a with speciWed arity and sorting sz z (az ) = [F 1 , …, F n , F], term abstraction and application, type abstraction and application. This gives the following term syntax: f = xz * a sz (a) (z f, …, fzyz ) * lx : F . fz z * f fy * lX . fy * fy Fz .
As one can see, types are not only used to type terms, but also, as variables, to build them. Terms having (possibly besides term variables) type variables among their constituents can then be considered as "parametrized" proofs or operations. To return to the former example of the swapping of values, lx : Int . ly : Int . +z y, xz , generalizes into LX . lx : X . ly : X . +z yz , xz ,.
As is the case for types, rules for generating well-typed terms mention contexts. A term context is a sequence G = [xz 1 : F 1 , …, x m : F m z ] of distinct typed variables (the variables are said to make up the domain of the context, domz (G)). One writes D|G (D being a type context) to mean D|F i z for each F i z in G.
Proved terms (typing rules):
C Term Variables:
D|GwwwwD|FwwwwD|GN
Dz 2 G, xz :z z F, GN|xz :z z F C Binary Products:
D2 G, xz :z z Fz z |fz z :z C D2 G |lxz :z z F . fz z :z z F v yC C Application to a term: 
As we can Wnally see, pso allows a type-theoretic formalization of vicious circularity. Indeed, a polymorphic type such as LXz .z Ty(Xy) can be applied to any type, including itself. Besides, a polymorphic term takes as input any type, including its own. This clearly violates the vicious-circle principle. How could it be possible, on that basis, to catch up with Principiaz 's theory of logical types?
2.3wTypical ambiguity in polymorphic clothing
Following Kamareddine et al. (2002) , one can think of Principiaz 's theory of logical types as a type theory with propositional functions instead of lambda-calculus terms, and types in the sense of Principiaz instead of propositions-as-types. But it remains to implement the rules for polymorphic lambda-calculus so as to formalize typical ambiguity.
In compliance with the Wne-grained presentation of types I have advocated earlier, the rules for types are:
(i) oz = +! ; !, o is a ramiWed type (the type of individuals);
(ii) if ty a1 1 , …, ty am m , uy b1 1 , …, uy bn n wware ramiWed types, then +ty a1 1 , …, ty am m y; uy b1 1 , …, uy bn n w, g is a ramiWed type, with g = max(a i z , b j z ) + 1.
(As already stated, the mention of orders is in fact redundant.) Let's move on now to the typing rules. All propositional functions here are considered up to "a-equivalence", that is, up to a change of variables (in keeping with their respective types). The main rules are: 
D2 G |f  g : (tz 1 , …, tz m z , tz N 1 , …, tz N k z ; uz 1 , …, uz n z , uN 1 , …, uN l z ) (merging the types corresponding to identical variables or constants) C Abstraction from parameters:
C Type Application:
D2 G |LX . f : ;X . twwwwDz |tz N : Type D2 G | (z fzyz )tz N : ty[tz N/Xy]
The resulting system prtt (polymorphic ramiWed type theory) aims at formalizing Principiaz 's theory of logical types when typical ambiguity is built into the theory.
In Kamareddine et al. (2002) a rule for abstraction from propositional functions is needed:
az 1 , …, t n a n z ) a wwfz is predicativew wFV(z fzyz ) # domz (Gz ) G :y{z : (t 1 az 1 , …, t n a n z ) a y} | zy(z y 1 , …, y k z ) : (t 1 az 1 , …, t n a n z , (t 1 az 1 , …, t n a n z ) a z ) a+1
(z e ª domz (G)) Such a rule is not needed in prtt: variables of any type can be introduced at the onset, because all bound variables are recorded within each type, as in the Term Variables rule of pso.
2.4wTypical ambiguity and type-theoretic genericity
There is a way to extend type-theoretically the idea of typical ambiguity while sticking more closely to Russell's conception. Indeed, typical ambiguity in the "Prefatory Statement" is an example of parametric generality, as opposed to quantiWcational generality. Picking up on a suggestion due to Carnap (1983, p. 51) , Giuseppe Longo and Thomas Fruchart have suggested accounting for the "generic" value of types in pso by adding the following: "Axiom C": If M : ;X . s z and X is not among the free variables of s, then Mt = MtN for all types t, tN.
Axiom C intuitively means that an input (tz), which is not used to establish the type (as sz does not depend on Xy) of the corresponding output value (Mtz), bears no information as input. So if Mz has the type ;X . sz and X is not free in the type sz (i.e. sz is not a function of Xy), then it does not matter whether one applies M to tz or tN and one may consider both results to be equal. (Fruchart and Longo 1999, p. 46) Axiom C is consistent with Girard's system F, and the system Fc = F + Axiom C can prove the following "Genericity Theorem":
Let M and N have typez ;X . s. If Mt = Fc Nt for one type t, then M = Fc N.
"In other words, the behaviour of polymorphic terms is so 'uniform' that one can reduce Fc equality on every possible types [sicz ] to Fc equality on one single type t (no matter which one!)" (ibid.). That means that the proof or computation coded by a polymorphic term does not depend on the input type: in some cases, a particular instance sz [F/Xy], being parametric in F, can be described as being obtained by the uniform substitution of F for a type variable X, and thus may suUce to determine the fully general proof, i.e., to get to the universal ;X . s. When this happens, the type F is said to be generic. This is not always the case, otherwise any term s : Fz could lead to a proof of the absurdum ;X .yX.
But Russell precisely does not claim that every proposition containing typically ambiguous symbols can be proved to be true in any assigned type or, in other words, that it has "permanent truth". Typical ambiguity is brought into play only in the speciWc realm of "formal arithmetic". 9 See Reynolds 1984 and Jacobs 1999, 8.3.3. Type-theoretic genericity can be a way to describe accurately the fact that arithmetical truths, particularly, have a "stable truth-value".
2.5wSemantical issues
Let's now look at a natural set-theoretic semantics forz prtt. The idea is to interpret each type uz as a set, namely as the set [uy] of all the terms whose type is uz . Because of the quantiWcation binding type variables, types are considered themselves as members of a set z of sets, so that functions between the sets in z can serve as interpretations of terms: proved that there is not set of sets z z that is closed under exponents and dependent products over itself, except for a set z z whose every member X e z z has at most one element. 9 This would imply in particular that there is only one individual (one element only in Iy). This is, of course, not practicable as an option. Actually, one of the main available interpretations of polymorphic type theory is not set-theoretic, but pertains to "Wbred category theory".
More speciWcally, proved types Xz 1 , Xz 2 , … X z n | Fz z are interpreted as maps [Xz 1 , Xz 2 , … Xz n | Fz z ] : Uz n v U in a category Cz consisting of all the Wnite products of some distinguished object Uz . A proved type is thus a member of some Cz z (Uz n , Uy). For example, the proved type Xz 1 , Xz 2 | Xz 1 is interpreted as the projection Uy 2 v Uz . Then, the rules of derivation of proved types become maps between such Cz z (Uz n , Uy)'s. For example, binary product consists in a family of operations B n : Cz z (Uz n , Uy) × Cz z (Uz n , Uy) v Cz z (Uz n , Uy), and abstraction on types in a family ; n : Cz z (U × Uz n , Uy) v Cz z (Uz n , Uy). Finally, for each proved term Xz 1 , … Xz n 2 F 1 , …, F m | f : F, suppose that each proved type F j z has been interpreted as f j = [Xz 1 , …, Xz n | F j z ] e Cz z (Uz n , Uy), and that F has been interpreted as fx=x[Xz 1 , …, Xz n | F] e Cz z (Uz n , Uy). It is then natural to interpret fz as a morphism [z fyz ] : fz 1 × … × fz m v f in the category Cz z(Uz n , Uy). It is, of course, necessary to throw in further constraints in order to account for the typing rules, as well as for the functional and polymorphic equalities.
Still, the underlying idea is clear: it is to consider a base category C consisting of all the Wnite products of some object U, and to assign to each object Uz n in Cz -z thought of as a type contextz -z the "Wbre" Cz z (Uz n , Uy), that is, a category whose objects are proved types in that context, and whose morphisms are corresponding proved terms. The judgment zD2 G | t z : Fz becomes a logical relation in the Wbre over the type context Dz|z G. Hence, each such type context becomes an index for a logic describing what happens in that context, 10 and substitution of a type for a type variable amounts to reindexing.
Since categorical semantics is called for as a way to handle impredicativity, it would be interesting to see how to adapt it to the case ofz prtt. I leave it for further examination.
2.6wConclusion
To sum up brieXy, there are two kinds of generality of logical types in Principiaz : formality, which is an external generality peculiar to types, and ambiguity, which is an internal one. Even though typical ambiguity is described by Russell himself as a form of context relativity (PMz 1: 65), these two kinds of generality are independent and should not be confused. The Wrst one has to do with the fact that type theory gives rise to a variety of realizations, so that each type will be inhabited by diTerent terms according to the epistemic perspective that is considered. The second one has to do with typical ambiguity properly speaking, not as a shortcoming or a stopgap of Principiaz 's system, nor as a slackening in the original logical seriousness, but as a positive feature that can be accounted for in a logical way.
Each of the two threads that I have just set out gives rise to a semantical perspective. In the Wrst case, I have argued that each epistemic realization of the formal system of ramiWed type theory constitutes in its own right a "model" of that theory. In the second case, I have brought up the possibility of construing typical ambiguity polymorphically, and to provide the resulting polymorphic ramiWed type theory with a model, along the lines of the categorical interpretation of second-order lambdacalculus. These two perspectives are enough to suggest substantial connections between Principiaz 's logic and modern semantics.
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